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The Arab spring has highlighted the need to clarify the 
important role that social policy could play in contributing to the 
emergence of socio-economic systems and political regimes that are 
both democratic and developmental. These new possibilities for social 
policymaking had been barred under the former autocratic regimes 
(see Karshenas and Alami, 2011). 
Any new social policy regimes will have to be the outcome of complex 
social dialogue between different interest groups. Hence, it is important 
to underline the main contours of the issues that need to be addressed 
in such a dialogue in these early stages of the democratization 
process. 
This Development Viewpoint highlights some of the key issues with 
regard to social protection, education and health provision. One of its 
main arguments is that the forms of social protection that had been 
based on the authoritarian social contracts of the 1950s and the 1960s 
in the Arab region have became increasingly dysfunctional during the 
era of globalization and economic reform. 
Deficiencies in Social Protection
Social protection in Arab countries has consisted of two major 
components: a largely contributory social insurance system, based 
in the formal sector, and social assistance, consisting mainly of cash 
transfers and public subsidies. Social safety nets have also been 
provided by civil society organizations, but because these have not 
been integrated with public schemes, they have likely tended to 
increase social fragmentation.  
Most importantly, publicly provided social protection has been neither 
rights-based nor comprehensive. And it has suffered from various 
practical problems, such as fragmentation and a lack of coordination. 
According to international rankings in the World Social Security Report 
2010/11, countries in the Arab region span the gamut between a 
medium rank and one that indicates a high degree of vulnerability. 
For example, Arab countries compare poorly with major countries such 
as Brazil, whose social security system now covers about two thirds of 
the population. In some respects, they also compare poorly, in general, 
with middle- and low-income countries. This is the case, for example, 
with the coverage of pensions, where the average Arab country (not in 
the Gulf Cooperation Council) falls well behind in the global rankings. 
The statutory provision of social protection in Arab countries is limited 
or absent. Even where such provision exists, it is based mostly on 
the social insurance contributions of public-sector employees, who 
represent only a very small segment of the workforce. Consequently, 
social security systems are very limited in their population coverage 
(typically in the range of 30-40% of the workforce). 
De facto coverage rates are even lower than de jure rates. For example, 
while Tunisia’s unemployment scheme (which is a rarity in the region) 
has had a nominal coverage rate of 37% of the economically active 
population, in 2008 only 3% of the unemployed (namely, just 13,000 
people) received benefits (ILO, 2011).
The limited coverage of social insurance, exacerbated by the virtual 
absence of unemployment insurance, has reinforced the segmentation 
of labour markets, thereby restricting labour mobility. Combined 
with the autocratic nature of the political regimes, which restricts 
participatory initiatives by independent associations of workers and 
employers, the lack of social protection has contributed to a unique 
combination of low productivity, high unemployment, and dismal job 
creation throughout the region. 
Another major deficiency in Arab systems of social protection has 
been the lack of adequate statutory arrangements for maternity 
leave. Typically, insurance for maternity leave is either non-existent or 
inadequate. Where it exists, the burden is on the employer, not the state 
(ILO 2010). This is one of the reasons that Arab countries have some of 
the lowest female labour force participation rates in the world.
Social assistance across the region has also had a dismal performance 
in outreach and impact. The region does not have universal social 
grants or large-scale family allowance schemes, which are now being 
implemented by over 30 low- and middle-income developing countries 
in other regions. Also, the level of benefits paid by Arab states is low.  
Rather than introducing insurance systems linked to the new 
requirements of the labour market, public resources have increasingly 
been channelled into poverty alleviation schemes through a 
fragmented institutional set-up within the state itself and have been 
increasingly disbursed by NGOs.  
Such residual forms of social transfers, such as consumer subsidies, had 
come to be regarded by the autocratic regimes as charities bestowed 
upon a compliant population. The gap created by the inadequacies 
of the social welfare regime was increasingly filled by faith-based and 
communal-based charities. This trend created social fragmentation 
and in time contributed to growing social conflicts.
Deficiencies in Education 
On the surface, educational progress in the Arab states has looked 
impressive. For example, the average number of years of schooling 
more than doubled, from under 3 years in 1980 to 6.8 years by 2010. 
However, the region still tends to lag behind its comparators in terms 
of average years of schooling. In 2010, for example, the average years 
of schooling in such countries as Mexico, Peru, Republic of Korea and 
Thailand were at least 9 years. 
On the whole, the region has only attained 54% of the mean years of 
schooling that would be commensurate with its average per capita 
income. Thus, despite basic progress in reducing illiteracy, the region 
still lags significantly behind in terms of the depth of its education. 
Moreover, educational deficiencies are particularly characteristic of 
the poorer income quintiles within countries. Access to education 
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Figure 1: Out of Pocket Health Expenditure 
(in total health expenditure) in Arab countries, 
2005-2010
Source: Karshenas and Alami 2011
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continues to be sharply differentiated by class, region and gender. For 
instance, in Arab countries 60% of the children not enrolled are girls. 
Moreover, out-of-school ratios for rural and urban areas are distinctly 
different—namely, 30% and 18%, respectively. Moreover, factors 
leading to marginalisation, such as poverty, gender and geography, 
tend to reinforce one another.
The region also performs worse than others on internationally 
comparable test scores. Its average number of grade repeaters is 
relatively high, indicating that the region has serious problems 
of educational quality and relevance. Where budgets have been 
trimmed, these problems have been compounded by inadequate 
physical resources and financial resources. Arab public education has 
progressively declined in quality and availability, and public schooling 
is often now considered synonymous with poor-quality and over-
crowded education. 
In order to secure a decent education for their children, families have 
increasingly had to resort to financing private education or tutoring. 
This has resulted in almost obligatory out-of-pocket spending, even 
for pupils in public institutions. Without paying private tuition, families 
are unable to get their children into universities or colleges. As a result, 
educational performances are now reinforcing existing inequalities in 
opportunities. 
Furthermore, widespread unemployment in the region stems 
from two education-related problems. First, because low levels of 
educational attainment make Arab economies less competitive, the 
potential to expand employment generation in productive activities 
has been limited. Second, the mismatch between the required skills of 
the labour market and those produced by the education system has 
increased both structural and frictional unemployment.
Deficiencies in Health Provision
Most Arab countries have public health care systems, but these do 
not adequately cover the whole population – neglecting in particular 
rural areas and poorer income groups. These systems are urban 
based, focused on often mediocre tertiary care, and suffer from 
fragmentation. 
Having access to basic health care is often regarded as a citizenship 
right. In practice, however, receiving good-quality medical care is far 
from being universally provided in the Arab region. Access is usually 
restricted to public sector employees and is based on social insurance 
contributions. 
In effect, in most Arab countries, the private sector has become the 
dominant supplier of health services and coverage is available only 
to people covered by contributory insurance schemes. On average, 
public health insurance covers only 30%-40% of the population, but 
the rates are much lower in countries such as Egypt, Morocco and 
Yemen. Because of inadequate coverage, the population has unequal 
opportunities to access health services. And people remain highly 
vulnerable financially when they are injured or become seriously ill. 
Public health systems have had to contend with shrinking or stagnant 
resources while they have been called upon to respond effectively to 
growing populations. Public spending on health as a share of GDP in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2005-2009 was consistently 
below international norms. In fact, most Arab countries had spending 
that was below the 2.7% average for sub-Saharan Africa. 
This situation has been made worse by the low priorities placed on 
health provision by governments: the average share of public spending 
on health in total government expenditure in MENA countries in 2005-
2009 was just over 7.7%, compared to 8.6% in middle-income countries 
as a whole and 15% in high-income countries. 
Hence, access to health care in Arab countries has shifted from a 
principle of universality to one based on the ability to pay. As shown 
in  Figure 1, Arab countries tend to have higher ratios of private out-
of-pocket expenditures on health. In fact, countries such as Egypt and 
Syria, which are supposed to have universal public health systems, 
have experienced major deteriorations in health provision over time, 
bringing their levels closer to those in Yemen, the worst performer.  
Conclusion
Arab social policies have clearly failed their populations, either directly 
through inadequate provision, or indirectly through their negative 
impact on economic development and employment generation. 
Hence, the region is badly in need of an entire paradigm shift to a 
fairer, rights-based, systematic approach to social provision, which will 
support viable new economic development strategies.
Political regimes have clearly lacked the political will or desire to 
respond to such a challenge, and at times have blocked the social 
dialogue through which these issues could have been discussed and 
debated. The social policy regimes that have survived have become 
critically incapable of responding to current economic conditions, and 
have played, in fact, an important role in spreading unemployment 
and underemployment, particularly among the youth. 
These stark deficiencies in social policies in the region have 
undoubtedly contributed significantly to motivating the Arab Spring. 
And the ensuing social uprisings have only served to underline the 
political urgency of transforming social policies. Ensuring any kind of 
future social justice in the region will depend on such fundamental 
reforms.
References
International Labour Office (2010). World Social Security Report 2010/2011, ILO: 
Geneva.
International Labour Office (2011). Tunisia: A New Social Contract for Fair and 
Equitable Growth, ILO: Geneva.
Karshenas M. and R. Alami (2011). Arab Spring and Social Policy, mimeo, United 
Nation’s Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), Beirut.
